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Abstract—In this paper, we consider linear quadratic team
problems with an arbitrary number of quadratic constraints in
both stochastic and deterministic settings. The team consists of
players with different measurements about the state of nature.
The objective of the team is to minimize a quadratic cost subject
to additional finite number of quadratic constraints. We first
consider the problem of countably infinite number of players
in the team for a bounded state of nature with a Gaussian
distribution and show that linear decisions are optimal. Then, we
consider the problem of team decision problems with additional
convex quadratic constraints and show that linear decisions are
optimal for both the finite and infinite number of players in the
team. For the finite player case, the optimal linear decisions can
be found by solving a semidefinite program. Finally, we consider
the problem of minimizing a quadratic objective for the worst
case scenario, subject to an arbitrary number of deterministic
quadratic constraints. We show that linear decisions are optimal
and can be found by solving a semidefinite program. Finally, we
apply the developed theory on dynamic team decision problems
in linear quadratic settings.
Index Terms—Team Decision Theory, Stochastic, Determin-
istic, Game Theory, Quadratic Constraints, Convex Functional
Optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of distributed decision making
with information constraints and quadratic constraints un-
der linear quadratic settings. For instance, information con-
straints appear naturally when making decisions over net-
works. Quadratic constraints appear due to the power limited
controllers in practice for instance. These problems can be
formulated as team problems. The team problem is an op-
timization problem with several decision makers possessing
different information aiming to optimize a common objective.
Early results in [1] considered static team theory in stochastic
settings and a more general framework was introduced by
Radner [2], where existence and uniqueness of solutions where
shown. Generalization to dynamic team problems for control
purposes where introduced in [3]. In [4], the deterministic
team problem with two team members was solved. The
solution can’t be easily extended to more than two players
since it uses the fact that the two members have common
information; a property that doesn’t necessarily hold for more
than two players. Also, a nonlinear team problem with two
team members was considered in [5], where one of the team
members is assumed to have full information whereas the other
member has only access to partial information about the state
of the world. Related team problems with exponential cost
criterion were considered in [6]. Optimizing team problems
with respect to affine decisions in a minimax quadratic cost
was shown to be equivalent to stochastic team problems with
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exponential cost, see [7]. The connection is not clear when the
optimization is carried out over nonlinear decision functions.
The deterministic version (minimizing the worst case scenario)
of the linear quadratic team decision problem was solved
in [8]. The problem of countably infinite number of players
under the power semi-norm was solved in [9] under certain
assumptions.
In this paper, we will consider both Gaussian and determin-
istic settings(worst case scenario) for team decision problems
under additional quadratic constraints. It’s well-known that
additional constraints, although convex, could give rise to
complex optimization problems if the optimized variables are
functions (as opposed to real numbers). For instance, linear
functions (that is functions of the form µ(x) = Kx where K
is a real matrix) are no longer optimal. We will illustrate this
fact by the following example.
Example 1: For x ∈ R, we want to minimize the objective
function
|u|2
subject to
|x− u|2 ≤ γ
Some Hilbert space theory shows that the optimal u is given
by
u = µ(x) = (|x| − √γ)x/|x| if |x|2 > γ,
and
u = µ(x) = 0 otherwise.
Obviously, the optimal u is a nonlinear function of x.
Increasing the dimension of x, and adding constraints
on the structure of u, for instance x ∈ RN and u =
µ(x) = (µ(x1), .., µ(xN )), certainly makes the constrained
optimization more complicated. The example above shows
that, in spite of having a convex optimization carried out over
a Hilbert space, the optimal decision function is nonlinear.
However, we show in the upcoming sections that problems
multiple quadratic constraints behave nicely when considering
the expected values of the objectives in the Gaussian case, in
the sense that linear decisions are optimal. We also extend the
results to the case of infinite number of players in the team.
For the deterministic counterpart which is not an optimization
problem over a Hilbert space, we show that linear decisions are
optimal and we show how to find the linear optimal decisions
by semidefinite programming. Finally, we apply the developed
theory on dynamic team decision problems in linear quadratic
settings.
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2II. NOTATION
The following table gives a list of the notation we are
going to use throughout the paper:
R+ The set of nonnegative real numbers.
N The set of positive integers.
Sn+ The set of n× n symmetric positive
semidefinite matrices.
Sn++ The set of n× n symmetric positive
definite matrices.
M The set of measurable functions.
C The set of functions µ : Rp → Rm with
µ(y) = (µ∗1(y1), µ
∗
2(y2), ..., µ
∗
N (yN ))
∗,
µi : Rpi → Rmi ,
∑
imi = m,
∑
i pi = p.
Ai The element of A in row position i.
 A  B ⇐⇒ A−B ∈ Sn+.
 A  B ⇐⇒ A−B ∈ Sn++.
K K = {K|K = diag(K1, ...,KN ),
Ki ∈ Rmi×pi}.
Tr Tr{A} is the trace of the matrix A.
N (m,X) The set of Gaussian variables with
mean m and covariance X .
III. LINEAR QUADRATIC GAUSSIAN TEAM THEORY
In this section, we will review a classical result in stochastic
team theory for a finite number of decision variables and
present an extension to the case of infinite number of decision
variables.
In the static team decision problem, one would like to solve
min
µ
E
[
x
u
]∗ [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
x
u
]
subject to yi = Cix+ vi
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N.
(1)
Here, x and v are independent Gaussian variables taking values
in Rn and Rp, respectively, with x ∼ N (0, Vxx) and v ∼
N (0, Vvv). Also, yi and ui will be stochastic variables taking
values in Rpi , Rmi , respectively, and p1 + ... + pN = p. We
assume that [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
]
∈ Sm+n, (2)
and Quu ∈ Sm++, m = m1 + · · ·+mN .
If full state information about x is available to each decision
maker ui, the minimizing u can be found easily by completion
of squares. It is given by u = Lx, where L is the solution to
QuuL = −Qux.
Then, the cost function in (1) can be rewritten as
J(x, u) = E{xT (Qxx − LTQuuL)x}+
E{(u− Lx)TQuu(u− Lx)}.
(3)
Minimizing the cost function J(x, u), is equivalent to mini-
mizing
E{(u− Lx)TQuu(u− Lx)},
since nothing can be done about E{xT (Qxx − LTQuuL)x}
(the cost when u has full information).
The next result is due to Radner [2], showing that linear
decision are optimal for the finite-dimensional static team
problem
Proposition 1 (Radner): Let x and vi be Gaussian variables
with zero mean, taking values in Rn and Rpi , respectively,
with p1 + ... + pN = p. Also, let ui be a stochastic variable
taking values in Rmi , Quu ∈ Sm++, m = m1 + · · · + mN ,
L ∈ Rm×n, Ci ∈ Rpi×n, for i = 1, ..., N . Then, the optimal
decision µ to the optimization problem
min
µ
E{(u− Lx)∗Quu(u− Lx)}
subject to yi = Cix+ vi
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N.
(4)
is unique and linear in y.
Proof: For a proof, see [2].
It’s not clear how to extend the result above to the case of
infinite number of state and decision variables, that is N =∞.
This is an important case to approach dynamic team problems,
where the decision variables are over space and time, and the
time horizon that goes to infinity.
The next theorem establishes a generalization of the above
proposition for the infinite-dimensional case.
Theorem 1: Let x = (x∗1 x
∗
2 ...)
∗ and v = (v∗1 v
∗
2 ...)
∗
be infinite-dimenational vectors where xi is Gaussian taking
values in Rni and vi is Gaussian taking values in Rpi . Suppose
that E{x∗x},E{v∗v} < ∞. Also, let u = (u∗1 u∗2 ...)∗ be a
random infinite-dimensional vector with ui taking values in
Rmi , Quu an infinite dimensional, bounded, positive definite,
self-adjoint linear operator, L a bounded linear operator, and
Ci ∈ Rpi×∞ a bounded linear operator, for all i ∈ N. Then,
the optimal decision µ to the optimization problem
inf
µ
E{(u− Lx)∗Quu(u− Lx)}
subject to yi = Cix+ vi
ui = µi(yi)
for all i ∈ N.
(5)
is unique and linear in y.
Proof: Note first that yi is bounded since Ci, x, and vi
are bounded.
Let Z be the linear space of functions such that z ∈ Z if
zi is a linear transformation of yi, that is zi = Aiyi for some
real matrix Ai ∈ Rmi×pi . Since Quu is a bounded symmetric
positive definite linear operator, Z is a linear space under the
inner product
〈g, h〉 = E{g∗Quuh},
and norm
‖g‖2 = E{g∗Quug}.
The optimization problem in (5) where we search for the linear
optimal decision can be written as
min
u∈Z
‖u− Lx‖2 (6)
3Finding the best linear optimal decision u? ∈ Z to the above
problem is equivalent to finding the shortest distance from the
subspace Z to the element Lx (Lx is bounded since L and
x are bounded), where the minimizing u? is the projection of
Lx on Z , and hence unique. Also, since u? is the projection,
we have
0 = 〈u? − Lx, u〉 = E{(u? − Lx)∗Quuu},
for all u ∈ Z . In particular, for fi = (0, 0, ..., zi, 0, 0, ...) ∈ Z ,
we have
E{(u? − Lx)∗Quufi} = E{[(u? − Lx)∗Quu]izi} = 0.
The Gaussian assumption implies that
[(u? − Lx)∗Quu]i
is independent of zi = Aiyi, for all linear transformations Ai.
This gives in turn that [(u?−Lx)∗Quu]i is independent of yi.
Hence, for any decision µ ∈ M∩ C, linear or nonlinear, we
have that
E(u? − Lx)∗Quuµ(y) =
∑
i
E{[(u? − Lx)∗Quu]iµi(yi)}
= 0,
and
E(µ(y)− Lx)∗Quu(µ(y)− Lx)
= E(u? − Lx+ µ(y)− u?)∗Quu(u? − Lx+ µ(y)− u?)
= E(u? − Lx)∗Quu(u? − Lx)
+E(µ(y)− u?)∗Quu(µ(y)− u?)
+ 2E(u? − Lx)∗Quu(µ(y)− u?)
= E(u? − Lx)∗Quu(u? − Lx)
+E(µ(y)− u?)∗Quu(µ(y)− u?)
≥ E(u? − Lx)∗Quu(u? − Lx)
with equality if and only if µ(y) = u?. This concludes the
proof.
IV. TEAM DECISION PROBLEMS WITH POWER
CONSTRAINTS
In practice, we often have power constraints on the control
variables of the from γi ≥ E|µi(yi)|2. The question is whether
linear decisions are optimal and if there is a practical algorithm
that can obtain optimal decisions. The introductory example
clearly showed that linear decisions are not optimal for the
case of point-wise optimization with a power constraint. Thus,
there is no reason to expect that linear decisions are optimal
for the stochastic (average) case. This will be addressed in this
section.
Consider the modified version of the optimization problem
(1):
min
µ
E
[
x
u
]∗ [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
x
u
]
subject to yi = Cix
ui = µi(yi)
γi ≥ E|µi(yi)|2
for i = 1, ..., N.
(7)
The difference from Radner’s original formulation is that
we have added power constraints to the decision functions,
γi ≥ E|µi(yi)|2. Note that additional constraints in functional
optimization could give rise to complex nonlinear optimal
solution as was shown in Example 1 in the introduction.
In the sequel, we will prove a more general theorem, where
we consider power constraints on a set of quadratic forms in
both the state x and the decision function µ.
Theorem 2: Let x be a Gaussian variable with zero mean
and given covariance matrix X , taking values in Rn. Also,
let
[
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
]
∈ Sm+n+ , R0 ∈ Sm++,
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
]
∈ Sm+n, and
Rj ∈ Sm+ , for j = 1, ...,M . Assume that the optimization
problem
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
subject to E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
≤ γj
j = 1, ...,M
(8)
is feasible. Then, linear decisions µ given by µ(x) = K(X)x,
with K(X) ∈ K, are optimal.
Proof: Consider the expression
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
+
M∑
j=1
λj
(
E
[
x
µ(x)
] [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
− γj
)
.
Take the expectation of a quadratic form with index j to
be larger than γj . Then, λj → ∞ makes the value of the
expression above infinite. On the other hand, if the expectation
of a quadratic form with index j is smaller than γj , then the
maximizer λj is optimal for λj = 0.
Now let p? be the optimal value of the optimization problem
(8), and consider the objective function
[
x
u
]∗ [
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
] [
x
u
]
= x∗(Q0 − S0R−10 S∗0 )x
+ (u+R−10 S
∗
0x)
∗R0(u+R−10 S
∗
0x).
We have that Q0−S0R−10 S∗0  0, since it’s the Schur com-
plement of R0 in the positive semi-definite matrix
[
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
]
.
Since R0  0, a necessary condition for the objective function
to be zero is that u = −R−10 S∗0x, and so u must be linear (In
order for u to have the structure given by C, R−10 S∗0 must be
in K, to satisfy the information constraints).
4Now assume that p? > 0. We have
p? = min
µ∈C
max
λi∈R+
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
+
M∑
j=1
λj
(
E
[
x
µ(x)
] [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
− γj
)
= min
µ∈C
max
λi∈R+
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗([
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
]
+
M∑
j=1
λi
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
])[
x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
(9)
Now introduce λ0 and the matrix
[
Q S
S∗ R
]
=
M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
]
,
and consider the minimax problem
p0 = min
µ∈C
max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
(10)
Note that a maximizing λ0 must be positive, since λ0 = 0
implies that p0 ≤ 0, while λ0 > 0 gives p0 > 0. We can
always recover the optimal solutions of (9) from that of (10)
by dividing all variables by λ0, that is p? = p0/λ0, λj 7→
λj/λ0, and µ 7→ µ/λ0. Now we have the obvious inequality
(min max{·} ≥ max min{·})
p0 ≥ max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
][ x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
For any fixed values of λj , we have R  0, so Theorem 1
gives the equality
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
] [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
x
µ(x)
]
=
min
K∈K
E
[
x
Kx
] [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
x
Kx
]
,
where the minimizing K is unique. Thus,
p0 ≥ max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗( M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
])[
x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
= max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
min
K∈K
E
[
x
Kx
]∗( M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
])[
x
Kx
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj .
The objective function is radially unbounded in K since R 
0. Hence, it can be restricted to a compact subset of K. Thus,
p0 ≥ max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
min
K∈K
E
[
x
Kx
]∗ M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
][ x
Kx
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
= min
K∈K
max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
E
[
x
Kx
]∗ M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
][ x
Kx
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
≥ min
µ∈C
max
λj≥0∑M
j=0 λj=1
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ M∑
j=0
λi
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
][ x
µ(x)
]
−
M∑
j=1
λjγj
= p0,
where the equality is obtained by applying Proposition 2 in
the Appendix, the second inequality follows from the fact that
the set of linear decisions Kx, K ∈ K, is a subset of C, and
the second equality follows from the definition of p0. Hence,
linear decisions are optimal, and the proof is complete.
Remark: Although Theorem 1 is stated and proved for y =
x and u = µ(y) = µ(x), it extends easily to the case y = Cx
for any matrix C, which is often the case in applications. Note
also that we may set N = ∞ and the result would still hold
by using Theorem 2 in the proof.
V. COMPUTATION OF THE OPTIMAL TEAM DECISIONS
The optimization problem that we would like to solve when
assuming linear decisions is
min
γ0,K∈K
γ0
subject to E
[
x
KCx
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
≤ γj ,
j = 0, ...,M,
x ∼ N (0, H2).
(11)
5with H  0. Note that we can write the constraints as
E
[
x
KCx
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
= E
{
Tr
[
I
KC
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
KC
]
xx∗
}
= TrH
[
I
KC
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
KC
]
H,
(12)
where we used that Exx∗ = X = H2. Hence, we obtain a set
of convex quadratic inequalities (convex since Rj  0 for all
j)
TrH
[
I
KC
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
KC
]
H ≤ γj .
There are many existing computational methods to solve
convex quadratic optimization problems (see [10]).
Alternatively, we can formulate the optimization problem as
a set of linear matrix inequalities as follows. For simplicity,
we will assume that Rj  0 for all j (The case Rj  0 is
analogue with some technical conditions).
Theorem 3: The team optimization problem (11) is equiv-
alent to the semi-definite program
min
γ0,K∈K
γ0
subject to TrPj ≤ γj
(13)
0 
[
Pj −HQjH −HSjKCH −HC∗K∗S∗jH HC∗K∗Rj
RjKCH Rj
]
j = 0, ...,M.
Proof: Introduce the matrices Pj ∈ Sn, and write the
given constraints as
γj ≥ TrPj
Pj −H
[
I
KC
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
KC
]
H  0. (14)
Now we have that
0  Pj −H
[
I
KC
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
KC
]
H
= Pj −HQjH −HSjKCH −HC∗K∗S∗jH
−HC∗K∗RjKCH.
(15)
Since Rj  0, the quadratic inequality above can be trans-
formed to a linear matrix inequality using the Schur comple-
ment ([10]), which is given by
0 
[
Pj −HQjH −HSjKCH −HC∗K∗S∗jH HC∗K∗Rj
RjKCH Rj
]
Hence, our optimization problem to be solved is given by
min
γ0,K∈K
γ0
subject to TrPj ≤ γj
0 
[
Pj −HQjH −HSjKCH −HC∗K∗S∗jH HC∗K∗Rj
RjKCH Rj
]
j = 0, ...,M.
which proves our theorem.
VI. DETERMINISTIC TEAM PROBLEMS WITH QUADRATIC
CONSTRAINTS
We considered the problem of static stochastic team decision
in the previous sections. This section treats an analogous
version for the deterministic (or worst case) problem. For the
dynamic setting with partially nested information(which will
be discussed in the next section), this corresponds to the H∞
control problem. Although the problem formulation is very
similar, the ideas of the solution are considerably different,
and in a sense more difficult.
The deterministic problem considered is a quadratic game
between a team of players and nature. Each player has limited
information that could be different from the other players in
the team. This game is formulated as a minimax problem,
where the team is the minimizer and nature is the maximizer.
Consider the following team decision problem
inf
µ
J(x, u)
subject to yi = Cix
ui = µi(yi)
for i = 1, ..., N
(16)
where ui ∈ Rmi , m = m1 + · · ·+mN , Ci ∈ Rpi×n.
J(x, u) is a quadratic cost given by
J(x, u) = sup
x≤1
[
x
u
]∗ [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
] [
x
u
]
,
where [
Qxx Qxu
Qux Quu
]
∈ Sm+n.
We will be interested in the case Quu  0. The players u1,...,
uN make up a team, which plays against nature represented
by the vector x, using µ ∈ S, that is
µ(Cx) =
 µ1(C1x)...
µN (CNx)
 .
Now consider the team problem (16) and note that an
equivalent condition for the existence of a decision function
µ? ∈ C that achieves the value of the game γ? is that[
x
µ?(Cx)
]∗ [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
x
µ?(Cx)
]
≤ γ?|x|2
for all x. This is equivalent to[
x
µ?(Cx)
]∗ [
Q− γ?I S
S∗ R
] [
x
µ?(Cx)
]
≤ 0
for all x. This is an example of a quadratic constraint.
We could also have a set of quadratic constraints that have
to be mutually satisfied. For instance, in addition to the
minimization of the worst case quadratic cost, we could have
constraints on the induced norms of the decision functions
|µi(Cix)|2
|x|2 ≤ γi for all x 6= 0, i = 1, ...,M,
or equivalently given by the quadratic inequalities
6|µi(Cix)|2 − γi|x|2 ≤ 0 for all x, i = 1, ...,M.
Also, the team members could share a common power source,
and the power is proportional to the squared norm of the
decisions µi:
M∑
i=1
|µi(Cix)|2 − c|x|2 ≤ 0 for all x,
for some positive real number c.
It’s not clear whether linear decisions are optimal, since the
example given at the introduction indicates that, in determin-
istic settings, nonlinear decisions are optimal pointwise.
Theorem 4: Let [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
]
∈ Sm+n
for j = 0, 1, ...,M , R0 ∈ Sm++, Rj ∈ Sm+ for j = 1, ...,M .
Suppose that there exists a decision function µ ∈ C such that
sup
x∈Rn
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
≤ 0, j = 0, ...,M.
(17)
Then, there exists a linear decision µ(x) = Kx, K ∈ K, such
that (17) is satisfied.
Proof: Suppose there exists a decision function µ ∈ C
such that (17) is satisfied. Then, for any Gaussian variable
x ∼ N (0, X), we have that
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
≤ 0.
Equivalently, for a given x ∼ N (0, X), the optimal value s
of the optimization problem
min
µ∈C
E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Q0 S0
S∗0 R0
] [
x
µ(x)
]
subject to E
[
x
µ(x)
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
µ(x)
]
≤ 0
j = 1, ...,M
(18)
must be nonpositive, s ≤ 0. But Theorem 2 gives that the
decision function µ(x) = K(X)x is optimal, with K(X) ∈ K.
Since Exx∗ = X , we get the inequalities
0 ≥ E
[
x
K(X)x
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
K(X)x
]
= E
{
x∗
[
I
K(X)
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
K(X)
]
x
}
= Tr
[
I
K(X)
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
K(X)
]
X
(19)
for all j. Now let λi ≥ 0, i = 0, ...,M , and[
Q S
S∗ R
]
=
M∑
j=0
λj
[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
]
.
Introduce the set
X = {X : X  0,TrX = 1}.
The fact that for every covariance matrix X there is a matrix
K(X) such that (19) holds implies
max
λi≥0,X∈X
min
K∈K
Tr
[
I
K
]∗ [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
I
K
]
X ≤ 0.
For every fixed X , we have a max-min problem which is
convex in K and linear in λi, so we can switch the order of
the minimization and maximization to get the max-min-max
inequality
max
X∈X
min
K∈K
max
λi≥0
Tr
[
I
K
]∗ [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
I
K
]
X ≤ 0.
which is equivalent to the existence of a matrix K ∈ K such
that [
I
K
]∗ [
Q S
S∗ R
] [
I
K
]
 0
for every set of λi ≥ 0, i = 0, ...,M . This implies that there
must exist a matrix K ∈ K such that[
I
K
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
K
]
 0, (20)
for all j. Finally, (20) implies that
x∗
[
I
K
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
K
]
x ≤ 0 for all x, j = 0, ...,M,
(21)
and the proof is complete.
Theorem 5: Let Ci ∈ Rpi×n, for i = 1, ..., N . Let[
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
]
∈ Sm+n for j = 0, ...,M , and Rj ∈ Sm+ for
0 = 1, ...,M . Then, the set of quadratic matrix inequalities[
x
KCx
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
≤ 0 ∀x, j = 0, ...,M,
(22)
is equivalent to[
Qj + SjKC + C
∗K∗S∗j C
∗K∗Rj
RjKC −Rj
]
 0, i = 0, ...,M.
(23)
Proof: We have the following chain of inequalities:[
x
KCx
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
x
KCx
]
≤ 0
m[
I
KC
]∗ [
Qj Sj
S∗j Rj
] [
I
KC
]
 0
m
Qj + SjKC + C
∗K∗S∗j + C
∗K∗RjKC  0
m
A =
[
Qj + SjKC + C
∗K∗S∗j C
∗K∗Rj
RjKC −Rj
]
 0,
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Fig. 1. The graph reflects the interconnection structure of the dynamics
between four systems. The arrow from node 2 to node 1 indicates that system
1 affects the dynamics of system 2 directly.
where the last equivalence follows from taking the Schur
complement of Rj in A (see [10]). Hence, our optimization
problem becomes[
Qj + SjKC + C
∗K∗S∗j C
∗K∗Rj
RjKC −Rj
]
 0, (24)
for i = 0, ...,M . This completes the proof.
VII. DISTRIBUTED LINEAR QUADRATIC CONTROL WITH
QUADRATIC CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we will treat the distributed linear quadratic
H2 control problem with information constraints, which can
be seen as a dynamic team decision problem. The idea is
to transform the dynamic team problem to a static one, and
then explore information structures for every time step. The
information structure we will be concerned with is the partially
nested information structure which was introduced in [3].
Consider an example of four dynamically coupled systems
according to the graph in Figure VII. The equations for the
interconnected system are given by
x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
x3(k + 1)
x4(k + 1)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
x(k+1)
=

A11 0 A13 0
A21 A22 0 0
0 A32 A33 A34
0 0 0 A44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

x1(k)
x2(k)
x3(k)
x4(k)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
x(k)
+

B1 0 0 0
0 B2 0 0
0 0 B3 0
0 0 0 B4

︸ ︷︷ ︸
B

u1(k)
u2(k)
u3(k)
u4(k)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
u(k)
+

w1(k)
w2(k)
w3(k)
w4(k)

︸ ︷︷ ︸
w(k)
.
(25)
For instance, the arrow from node 2 to node 1 in the graph
means that the dynamics of system 2 are directly affected by
system 1, which is reflected in the system matrix A, where the
block A21 6= 0. On the other hand, system 2 does not affect
system 1 directly, which implies that A12 = 0. Because of
the “physical” distance between the subsystems, there will be
some constraints on the information available to each node.
The observation of system i at time k is given by
yi(k) = Cixi(k),
where
Ci =

Ci1 0 0 0
0 Ci2 0 0
0 0 Ci3 0
0 0 0 Ci4
 . (26)
Here, Cij = 0 if system i does not have access to yj(k). The
subsystems could exchange information about their outputs.
Every subsystem recieves the information with some time
delay, that is reflected by the interconnection structure. Let
Iki denote the set of observations yj(n) and control signals
uj(n) available to node i up to time k, n ≤ k, j = 1, ..., N .
Consider the following (general) dynamic team decision
problem with additional quadratic constraints:
inf
µ
J(u,w)
subject to x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) + w(k)
yi(k) = Cix(k)
ui(k) = µi : Iki → Rpi
for i = 1, ..., N
T−1∑
k=0
E
[
x(k)
u(k)
]∗
Qj
[
x(k)
u(k)
]
≤ γj
for j = 1, ...,M
(27)
where
J(u,w) = Ex∗(T )Qfx∗(T )
+
T−1∑
k=0
E
[
x(k)
u(k)
]∗
Q
[
x(k)
u(k)
]
(28)
Qf , Q,Qj  0, x(k) ∈ Rn, yi(k) ∈ Rmi , ui(k) ∈ Rpi .
Now write x(k) and y(k) as
x(k) = Atx(k − t) +
t−1∑
n=0
AnBu(k − n− 1)+
+
t−1∑
n=0
Anw(k − n− 1),
yi(k) = CiA
tx(k − t) +
t−1∑
n=0
CiA
nBu(k − n− 1)+
+
t−1∑
n=0
CiA
nw(k − n− 1).
(29)
Note that the summation over n is defined to be zero when
t = 0.
The next result is an extension of [3] for the case of
optimal control with additional quadratic constraints where it
presents a condition on the information structure for which a
dynamic problem can be transformed to a static team problem.
The condition is known as the partially nested information
structure.
8Theorem 6: Consider the optimization problem given by
(27) with the exogenous input w = (w∗(0) w∗(1) ...)∗ such
that E{w∗w} <∞. The problem is equivalent to a static team
problem in the form (8) if
yj(k) ∈ Iki ⇒
uj(k − n− 1) ∈ Iki for [CiAnB]ij 6= 0
(30)
for all n such that 0 ≤ n < t, t = 0, 1, 2, .... In particular, the
optimal solution to the optimization problem given by (27) is
linear in the observations Iki if condition (30) is satisfied.
Proof: Introduce
x¯ =
w(0)w(1)
...
 , u¯i =
ui(0)ui(1)
...
 ,
Then, we can write the cost function J(x, u) as
E
[
x¯
u¯
]∗
Q¯
[
x¯
u¯
]
.
for some symmetric positive definite matrix Q¯. Similarly, the
quadratic constraints
T−1∑
k=0
E
[
x(k)
u(k)
]∗
Qj
[
x(k)
u(k)
]
≤ γj
may be written as
E
[
x¯
u¯
]∗
Q¯j
[
x¯
u¯
]
≤ γj .
for some symmetric positive definite matrices Q¯j , j =
1, ...,M . Consider the expansion given by (29). The problem
here is that yi(k) depends on previous values of the control
signals u(n) for n = 0, ..., k−1. The components uj(k−n−1)
that yi(k) depends on are completely determined by the
structure of the matrix [CiAnB]ij .
Now if condition (30) is satisfied, node i has the information
of uj(k−n−1) available at time k if the element [CiAnB]ij 6=
0. Then, node i can form the new output measurement
yˇi(k) = yi(k)−
k−1∑
n=0
CiA
nBu(k − n− 1)
= Akx(0) +
k−1∑
n=0
CiA
nw(k − n− 1).
(31)
Let
y¯i(k) =
yˇi(0)yˇi(1)
...
 .
With these new variables introduced, the optimization problem
given by equation (27) reduces to the following static team
decision problem:
inf
µ
E
[
x¯
u¯
]∗
Q¯
[
x¯
u¯
]
subject to ui(k) = µi(y¯i(k))
for i = 1, 2, ...
E
[
x¯
u¯
]∗
Q¯j
[
x¯
u¯
]
≤ γj
for j = 1, 2, ...,M
(32)
and the optimal solution u¯ is linear according to Theorem 2.
This completes the proof.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied multi-objective linear quadratic optimiza-
tion of team decisions in both stochastic and deterministic
settings. Constrained decision problems tend to have nonlinear
optimal solutions. We have shown that for the Gaussian and
worst case scenario settings, respectively, linear decisions are
in fact optimal, and we can find the respective linear optimal
solutions by solving a semidefinite program. We also showed
that linear decision are optimal when the number of players in
the time is infinite. Future work will consider an S-procedure
sort of a result, where we want to find decision function
µ such that the inequality J0(µ(x), x) ≤ 0 is satisfied if
J1(µ(x), x) ≤ 0, where J0, J1 are some quadratic forms in
µ and x. However, this is a much harder problem since the
search for linear a function µ(x) is not a convex problem, and
it’s not clear if it can be convexified.
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9APPENDIX
Let J = J(u,w) be a functional defined on a product vector
space U×W, to be minimized by u ∈ U ⊂ U and maximized
by w ∈ W ⊂ W, where U and W are the constrained sets.
This defines a zero-sum game, with kernel J , in connection
with which we can introduce two values, the upper value
J¯ := inf
u∈U
sup
w∈W
J(u,w),
and the lower value
J := sup
w∈W
inf
u∈U
J(u,w).
Obviously, we have the inequality J¯ ≥ J . If J¯ = J = J?, then
J? is called the value of the zero-sum game. Furthermore, if
there exists a pair (u? ∈ U,w? ∈W ) such that
J(u?, w?) = J?,
then the pair (u?, w?) is called a (pure-strategy) saddle-
point solution. In this case, we say that the game admits a
saddle-point (in pure strategies). Such a saddle-point solution
will equivalently satisfy the so-called pair of saddle-point
inequalities:
J(u?, w) ≤ J(u?, w?) ≤ J(u,w?), ∀u ∈ U,∀w ∈W.
Proposition 2: Consider a two-person zero-sum game on
convex finite dimensional action sets U1 ×U2, defined by the
continuous kernel J(u1, u2). Suppose that J(u1, u2) is strictly
convex in u1 and strictly concave in u2. Suppose that either
(i) U1 and U2 are closed and bounded, or
(ii) Ui ⊆ Rmi , i = 1, 2, and J(u1, u2)→∞ as ‖u1‖ → ∞,
and J(u1, u2)→ −∞ as ‖u2‖ → ∞.
Then, the game admits a unique pure-strategy saddle-point
equilibrium.
Proof: See [11], pp. 177.
